At the beginning of the 19th century, when the French armies were triumphantly marching across Europe, the Russian ambassador in Paris, Prince Kurakin, reported to St. Petersburg: “There can no longer be any doubt that Napoleon has finally decided on this war in his mind; he is only postponing its beginning.”

Russia began hurriedly preparing for defense. In March 1810, the Minister of War Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly presented Alexander I with a note “On the Defense of the Western Borders of Russia,” which pointed to the necessity of constructing a defensive line along the Western Dvina (Daugava): “Near Dinaburg or Druya, having chosen a good location, a fortress must be built that would guard communication with the army’s center and serve as reinforcement for one of the army’s units, but Dinaburg seems more convenient for this purpose because there are still remnants of fortifications there that could greatly facilitate and speed up the work.”

Soon, the imperial government decided to strengthen Russia’s western border by building new fortresses to protect the road to St. Petersburg and Moscow. On March 14, 1810, by order of the Minister of War, a special commission led by engineer-colonel E. F. Hekel surveyed the Dvina River.

After inspecting the area, Hekel reported to the minister that the most suitable place for building the new fortress was Dinaburg. The response came two weeks later: “His Majesty the Emperor has most graciously approved your proposal to build a fortress at Dinaburg.” At that time, in May, even before the approval of estimates and plans, preparatory work began — leveling and surveying the terrain.

With the start of fortress construction, urban settlements were relocated to the area now called the Old Suburb. Parts of the settlement that could not be moved were bought out by the state treasury. A special commission was created to assess the expropriation of citizens’ property on land and buildings amounting to 50,061 rubles. The Jesuit College demanded 300,000 rubles in gold for lands and monastery buildings. By April 1811, all lands for the fortress were purchased. Colonel Hekel sought to quickly seize both banks of the Daugava. Having received entrenching tools from Moscow, he immediately began building a bridgehead. This allowed him to quickly overcome the reluctance of local landowners to sell land for the fortress construction. The left bank of the river was part of the Courland Governorate and belonged to Chamberlain Keyserling. The right bank, which had plenty of construction timber, belonged to Count Sieberg.

The workforce for the fortress construction mainly consisted of military units. This is evidenced by Barclay de Tolly’s correspondence. On May 17, 1810, he wrote to Major General Schwanebach that two sapper companies stationed in Dinaburg “should be under the command of engineer-colonel Hekel, who will employ them for fortress works.” A few days later, an order was issued to Lieutenant General Baggovut stating that by the emperor’s command “troops of the 4th division and reserve battalions are to be used for fortress works in Dinaburg,” and battalions of soldiers from Volyn, Tobolsk, Kremenchug, Vilna, Minsk, as well as battalions of the 4th Jäger Regiment, were sent there. The Mitava mountain battalion was ordered: “Hasten to Dinaburg for fortress works… This battalion will eventually be renamed the Dinaburg Battalion, where it will remain forever.”

To command the troops gathered in Dinaburg and properly organize construction, in June 1810 Major General of Artillery Prince Yashvil (chief of artillery of the 1st Corps of the 1st Western Army) was appointed. Significant forces were allocated for the construction of new fortifications. The Military Collegium’s order to the engineering expedition stated: “By the highest order, up to 10,000 troops and up to 300 artillery horses are now being assembled for fortress works near Dinaburg, where they will camp until winter.” Additionally, two thousand peasants from the Vitebsk Governorate, as well as free craftsmen and workers, were involved. A hospital with 300 beds was opened in Ilūkste under the supervision of the well-known physician-supervisor Dombrovsky to serve the troops.

The construction was impressive for its time. By June 1810, 10,000 soldiers had already begun work. They were stationed in camps on both banks of the river. Work was organized in two shifts. The initial estimate for the fortress construction was 546,643 rubles 90 kopecks. Of this, 472,906 rubles 80 kopecks were allocated for the main part, and 73,737 rubles 10 kopecks for the bridgehead fortification on the left bank of the Daugava. The fortress was planned to be completed in 3 years. In 1810, 160,000 rubles were to be spent, and in the following two years — 193,321 rubles 95 kopecks each year.

On August 8, 1810, the general construction plan of the fortress was approved, but a detailed internal layout project still had to be drawn up. On March 9, engineer-colonel Hekel sent the Minister of War an estimate for the construction of the Dinaburg fortress, detailing the required funds for purchasing materials, paying soldiers, free craftsmen, and workers. The estimate included building houses for 8 infantry companies and 2 artillery companies, officers’ quarters, kitchens, storerooms, four two-story stone officers’ quarters for 80 senior officers, two temporary powder magazines, premises for the engineering team, and other buildings. The fortress construction was now estimated at 791,552 rubles, including 29,000 rubles for building a floating bridge across the Daugava for unobstructed communication with fortifications on the left bank.

The plan provided for a garrison of 4,500 to 7,000 men and the installation of 595 fortress guns, of which 480 were in the fortress itself and 115 in the bridgehead fortification.

Additionally, 500 fortress rifles (heavy long-range rifled guns) were planned for use against enemy scouts, and 200 light cavalrymen were assigned for communication and illumination of the area at night.

Construction proceeded rapidly. To supply the fortress with building materials, lime and brick factories were established in the village of Stary Zamok, where soldiers worked. Stones and bricks from the old Dinaburg castle were also used, which peasants sold to the contractor supplying materials for the fortress construction.

Disagreements arose among the construction leaders, apparently prompting a report from the fortress builder Hekel to Barclay de Tolly: “The bridgehead fortification at Dinaburg fortress could have been completed this year if the troops worked daily and rested only on Sundays, but the commander of the troops gathered here does not order them to work on holidays, so many days are lost and the best time is missed.”

Nevertheless, despite concerns, the planned volume of work for 1810 was fully completed, as evidenced by Colonel Hekel being awarded the Order of St. Anna, 2nd class with diamonds.

By the end of 1810, most of the earth rampart in the bridgehead fortification was built, and in the main fortress, hills were leveled and drainage works carried out. In spring 1811, construction accelerated. Up to 15,000 people worked daily. To improve soldiers’ rations “for wine portions,” they began to be paid 10 kopecks daily as a reward, and from September 15 — 20 kopecks, which was a considerable sum at the time.

Due to an early onset of cold weather, the construction season ended on October 26 that year.

By spring 1812, bridgehead fortifications of zero profile were built on the left bank of the river. They consisted of two bastions and two half-bastions, equipped with 16 guns. As for the main fortress, according to the general plan, as Hekel reported on March 12, 1812, “less than half of the extensive works needed for completion had been done, and therefore, despite all possible intensification of work, it was not expected to bring it to a defensive state this year.”

However, despite the bridgehead fortification being purely earthen and only some foundation of the main rampart laid in the main fortress, on July 14, 1811, the fortress was declared a first-class fortress.

Since it had become clear by then that the Dinaburg fortress would not be completed by the start of the war with Napoleon, it was decided to strengthen the bridgehead fortification on the river side by building an additional rampart. Russia was preparing for war with the French. A large stockpile of food and military supplies was being amassed in Dinaburg to supply the 1st Western Army.

In May 1812, the French concentrated a 600,000-strong army on the Vistula.

Given the threatening situation, the Minister of War submitted a special report to the tsar proposing to approve the duties of commandants of the newly built fortresses. Signed: “So be it. Alexander I,” the duties were approved with the following content: “1. Responsible for defense with life and honor; 2. Know perfectly all residents inside and around the fortress, their status, behavior, and mindset; 3. Obtain full information about all incidents, not only obvious but also secret and intentional; 4. On the western borders, all fortresses must be in a state of military readiness. Commandants manage civil police. And during a siege, commandants are authorized as autocratic officials.”

This document aimed to increase the responsibility of garrisons of western fortresses and centralize all local forces under a single authority. Overall, it correctly anticipated the nature of commandants’ actions in case of a siege.

On the night of June 12 (24), 1812, Napoleon’s army invaded Russia. Under pressure from numerically superior enemy forces, the 1st and 2nd Western Armies began to retreat to join forces. The 1st Western Army was led by Barclay de Tolly (120,000 men from Vilna), and the 2nd by Bagration (40,000 men from Volkovysk).

Napoleon was heading for Moscow. To secure his flank from an attack from St. Petersburg and threaten the right flank of the Russian troops, he sent Marshal Macdonald’s 10th Corps toward Riga and Marshal Oudinot’s 2nd Corps toward Vilkomir (Ukmergė) — Dinaburg (Fig. 5).

The “Grand Army” (main French force) was to break through the stretched Russian defense and force the separated 1st and 2nd Western Armies to surrender. The retreat of the 1st Western Army to the Drissa fortified area opened the approach to the unprepared Dinaburg, whose garrison at that time numbered about 2,500 men and had no more than 80 guns and mortars.

Despite the incomplete fortifications, the military council on June 28 decided not to surrender the fortress without a fight, especially since from the perspective of a possible siege it looked more formidable than it actually was. Construction was halted, bastions were prepared for battle. In case the French captured them, the military council decreed: “All state property that could serve the enemy should be removed from Dinaburg to safe places, and what cannot be removed quickly or due to lack of peasant horses, combustible items should be burned, and iron buried in pits.” (The treasury of 180,205 rubles and written archives were also removed.)

The combat unfolded as follows. The 3rd squadron of hussars under Major Bedryaga was sent ahead and, engaging enemy scouts, defeated them and captured several prisoners. They also brought news that Marshal Oudinot’s 2nd French Corps, having taken Vilkomir (Ukmergė), was heading straight for Dinaburg, intending to cross to the right bank of the Daugava and threaten the right flank of the Russian troops. At that time, the possibility of the French marching on St. Petersburg was not excluded.

On July 1, near the settlement of Ierusalim and on the Kalkuny heights beyond the Daugava, Marshal Oudinot’s troops appeared, numbering 32,000 infantry and 2,100 cavalry — more than ten times the number of fortress defenders.

Some historians, studying the battles for the fortress, refer to the memoirs of participant General Marbot, who generally described the fighting for Dinaburg impartially and relatively reliably. Oudinot immediately sent General Marbot’s cavalry to the bridgehead fortification, but they encountered a small detachment of Russians entrenched in the former builders’ camp and were fired upon by them and the artillery of the bridgehead fortification. The attack faltered. But Marshal Oudinot again sent cavalry to the assault. Then General Marbot gave his officers freedom of action to choose the best paths between the barracks and ordered a renewed advance. As soon as the cavalry moved forward, it was met with rifle fire from infantry and volleys from the bridgehead artillery. The French retreated again. To assist the cavalry, Marshal ordered the recently arrived Portuguese infantry battalion to take the forward Russian positions near the barracks (Napoleon’s army included 65,000 allies: Germans, Belgians, Dutch, Austrians, and others). But the new attack was also unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, Marbot’s troops continued to suffer heavy losses from artillery fire from the bridgehead fortification. Therefore, having received permission from Oudinot for a new attack, he ordered the cavalry to scatter and break into the ranks of the Russian detachment to deprive the Russian artillerymen of the ability to support with cannon fire. This goal was achieved. Russian artillery support ceased. The detachment was forced to retreat from the barracks to the bridgehead fortification and cross to the right bank of the Daugava via the floating bridge.

General Marbot duly appreciated the organized resistance of the small Russian detachment and did not dare to send his cavalry in pursuit. Noticing Marbot’s hesitation, Oudinot himself rode to the bridge, urging soldiers to attack: “Brave soldiers! Act as you did at Vilkomir! Forward across the bridge! Blow up the gates and seize the city!”

His adjutant, General Lorentzetz, vainly tried to persuade the marshal not to do this, as it was too risky to cross the shaky bridge without railings under Russian artillery fire, only two abreast. The French troops could not have taken even the weakly defended Russian positions. But Oudinot was resolute. He said that the enemy’s fear and confusion would help him accomplish his plan.

Describing those days, Marbot portrays his “military foresight” favorably. Seeing the marshal’s unwavering will, he himself led the troops and ordered the cavalry to follow him two abreast on the bridge. His “most important tactical initiative” was to order gaps between riders equal to the length of a horse. This indeed helped the French break out of the bridge alive (though with heavy losses).

As soon as the enemy cavalry stepped onto the bridge, Russian artillery intensified fire. The French found themselves under cannon fire from the right bank and from the bridgehead artillery from the rear. More than 30 men were killed by the first volley, many wounded. Horses reared in fear, plunged into the water, while Russian artillery continued precise deadly fire. In panic, the French hastily and disorderly retreated. Later, French infantry regiments arrived, and Oudinot made a fourth attempt to attack the bridgehead fortification. Meeting heavy fire, the vaunted guards faltered, took cover, then fell back. The attack was repelled again.

Marshal Oudinot’s troops spent the whole day unsuccessfully trying to take the bridgehead fortification, but each time they were driven back by artillery fire from the Russian detachment under Major General Ulanov. By evening, the French withdrew to their starting positions.

On July 2, Major General of Artillery Prince Yashvil reported from Dinaburg to the Minister of War: “The enemy has besieged the Dinaburg bridgehead fortification with a large number of troops and artillery at almost cannon-shot distance… as for the main fortress, it is as if it did not exist.” This confirmed the correctness of the earlier decision to first create the bridgehead fortification, without which the storming of the fortress was unthinkable. For three days the enemy unsuccessfully attacked the bridgehead fortification, but the results remained disappointing for the French army. Russian soldiers, especially artillerymen, acted bravely and selflessly, showing courage, mutual assistance, and ingenuity in battle. It is enough to say that gun crews doubled the time required by the “Bombardier’s Regulations” to fire a shot. Part of the infantry of the bridgehead fortification, under the command of non-commissioned officers, manually dragged guns with wheeled carriages to change firing positions. This increased firing accuracy and created the impression that the number of artillery barrels on the fortification had increased.

Having lost many men killed and seeing the futility of their attempts to capture the fortress, after receiving Napoleon’s order to retreat, Marshal Oudinot withdrew his troops from Dinaburg on the night of July 4 and moved upstream along the left bank of the Daugava toward Drissa. Taking advantage of this, a small Russian detachment of “hunters” (volunteers) began pursuing the rear of the French corps and near the village of Kalkuny captured 80 Napoleonic soldiers. These were the first prisoners taken in such large numbers.

Thus, the enemy’s attempt to capture the Dinaburg fortress and threaten St. Petersburg from there was thwarted. The enemy offensive took a different direction. In memory of those events, 100 years later a fundraising campaign was held in the state to erect monuments to the heroes of the Patriotic War. In the fortress square, a fountain-monument “Glory of Russian Arms,” consisting of three 12-pounder guns, was installed. It remains a decoration of the fortress, reminding of the steadfastness and courage of Russian soldiers, heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812.

During the assault on the bridgehead fortification, an incident occurred that the fortress commandant I. P. Lvov mentioned in 1915. When the main fortress builder (by then already a major general) Hekel was in the bridgehead fortification, the highest-approved secret plan of the Dinaburg fortress disappeared, which for some reason was kept at his apartment.

It was suggested that perhaps French scouts took advantage of Hekel’s carelessness. Having obtained the layout of the fortifications and information about the firing sectors, the enemy could later use them in storming the fortifications. Since this secret plan formed the basis for the subsequent fortress construction, its disappearance could have had tragic consequences in the future.

Also mentioned is Colonel Tishin, sent by the tsar to evacuate surplus military supplies. However, Tishin apparently “overdid it” and, among other supplies, hastily removed guns from the main fortress’s armament and took away the powder stock. General Ulanov, fully occupied with repelling Oudinot’s attacks, could not pay attention to Tishin’s “activities” or stop them. According to I. N. Lvov, it is strange that he was not punished at all. Historical records only indirectly mention that “Colonel Tishin… later generally failed to live up to his position and was not promoted to general during Alexander I’s reign.”

After Oudinot’s troops left, it turned out that Dinaburg had nothing to defend itself against Marshal Macdonald’s detachments advancing with 35,000 troops along the Daugava from Riga.

Learning of the assault on Dinaburg, the Russian command sent reinforcements: four reserve infantry battalions and several squadrons of hussars. But these troops arrived too late; the French had already left. General Yashvil resigned himself to the necessity of abandoning the fortress and ordered Ulanov to destroy the fortifications and withdraw the troops. Later events showed that it was not yet too late to return the powder stock and guns. Moreover, Yashvil knew that the French did not have siege artillery.

Upon learning that the fortress was abandoned, the commander of the 1st Western Army disagreed with Yashvil’s decision and on July 8 ordered Hekel to assess the possibility of restoring fortifications that could prevent Marshal Macdonald from joining Oudinot’s troops.

In Rēzekne, Hekel stopped the retreating Wagenburg detachments. In Dinaburg itself, he found General Gamen’s troops numbering 3,700, who were finishing destroying the fortress’s defensive structures. These troops could later be needed to restore fortifications. However, upon learning of the approach of Marshal Macdonald’s corps, Gamen withdrew his detachment toward Rēzekne on July 15. Only a small cavalry detachment under Major Bedryaga remained near Dinaburg to observe the enemy and complete the destruction. Meanwhile, Hekel with engineering companies began restoring the bridge across the Daugava. He planned to bring all the bridgehead fortifications to a defensive state within 14 days.

However, given the situation, restoring the bridge could only benefit the French. And so it happened. On July 20, General Ricardo’s soldiers from Marshal Macdonald’s corps approached the fortress and stood nearby for several days, not daring to enter the abandoned fortifications. Then his troops began dismantling the earthworks, sending boastful dispatches about a “great victory.” A few days later, Ricardo crossed to the left bank of the Daugava and moved to join Marshal Murat’s troops (King of Naples), who formed the left column of the Grand French Army.

During the five-month stay in Dinaburg, Napoleon’s troops, as everywhere, plundered local residents, robbed houses, and seized food. Soon the French were defeated and fled Russia. At the end of 1812, Russian detachments returned to the fortress.

Thus, the unfinished fortress underwent its baptism of fire. The war showed that the site chosen for the fortress was very successful. The fortress could serve as a good second-line defense point and a base for concentrating large forces for active combat against the enemy advancing on the capital, as well as a starting point for delivering a strong blow to the enemy’s flank and rear.

Russian soldiers showed martial heroism and selflessness, but miscalculations and often sheer ignorance of the imperial command nullified mass patriotism and bravery. For example, in the book “1812” K. V. Tarle writes rather harshly: “Napoleon rated Russian generals very low. There was no real unified command in the Russian army, and it could not be otherwise because Alexander was with the army and constantly interfered with Barclay’s orders. Napoleon knew this well on the way to Vilna and ironically said to General-Adjutant Balashov, whom the tsar sent to Napoleon with a peace proposal: ‘What are they all doing? While Fül proposes, Armfeld contradicts, Bennigsen considers, Barclay, who is supposed to execute, does not know what to conclude, and they waste time doing nothing!’”

The war confirmed that Dinaburg is located on an important strategic direction, and another attempt was made to continue the fortress construction.

Sources:

https://dwaiu.narod.ru/kazak/dvinsk.html

https://www.visitdaugavpils.lv/ru/ar-verienu-izskanejis-5-starptautiskais-vesturiskas-rekonstrukcijas-festivals-dinaburg-1812/